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Abstract 
This study examines the socioeconomic and deterrence determinants of crime in 
Argentina for different typologies of property crimes and crimes against person. We 
employ a panel of Argentinean regions over the years 2000-2008. Our econometric 
methodology follows GMM estimator commonly applied for dynamic panel data model. 
The results give evidence that unemployment has a positive and significant effect on total 
and property crimes but its impact depends on the typology of the offense. However it has 
no effect on crimes against person. The importance and the sign of Income per capita 
depend on the typology of the crime.  Income inequality proved to be less important when 
explaining property crimes and crimes against person. The deterrence effects proxied by 
the arrest and sentence rates are always negative and very significant.  
 
 
Abstract 
Este trabajo estudia los determinantes socio económicos y de disuasión del crimen en 
Argentina para diferentes tipos de delitos contra la propiedad y las personas. Para ello 
utiliza un panel de provincias argentinas en el período 2000-2008.  El método 
econométrico con el que se estima es GMM. Los resultados muestran que el desempleo 
tiene un efecto positivo y significativo sobre el delito total y en delitos contra la propiedad 
y su impacto depende de la tipología del delito. Sin embargo no tiene ningún efecto sobre 
los delitos contra las personas. La importancia del ingreso per cápita depende de las 
características del delito. En tanto la desigualdad del ingreso tiene menor efecto en la 
explicación el delito. El efecto disuasión medido por la probabilidad de arresto y 
sentencia es siempre positive y significativo.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work by Becker (1968) that provided the first economic theory of crime, 
many works have been devoted to the study of criminal behavior. His paper explains how 
changes in the probability and severity of punishment can alter the individual’s decision to 
commit crime. Later, Ehrlich (1973) extended the Becker’s model by considering how 
individuals divide their time between legal and illegal activities. If legal income opportunities 
are scarce relative to the potential benefits of crime, people allocate more time to illegal 
activities and crime is more likely to occur.  
 
The large majority of the empirical studies has focused on United States (Ehrlich, 1973; 
Cornwell and Trumbull, 1994; Freeman, 1996; Glaeser, 1999; Grogger, 1998, Lochner, 2004; 
Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Baltagi, 2006; Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert, 2006) and United 
Kingdom (Wolpin, 1978; Machin and Meghir, 2004), even if during the last ten years a 
growing number of works analyse the determinants of crime for European countries such as 
Germany (Entorf and Spengler, 2000; Entorf and Winker, 2007), Greece (Saridakis and 
Spengler, 2009) Italy (Marselli and Vannini, 1997; Buonanno and Leonida, 2006), Norway 
(Aasness et al., 1994), Spain (Rodríguez, 2003; Bandrés-Diez Ticio, 2001; Buonnano and 
Montolio, 2008), Sweden (Sandelin and Skogh, 1986; Edmark, 2005; Oster and Agell, 2007), 
Switzerland (Fischer, 2005). Nevertheless, there are a few empirical studies for Latin Latin 
American countries, mainly Colombia (Gaviria, 2000; Garcette, 2004) Chile (Beyer and 
Vergara, 2002), and Brasil (Carneiro et al., 2005).  
 
In spite of this evidence, criminal activity has received little attention in Argentina and remains 
largely neglected by the economics of crime literature. However, we must mention some 
notable exemptions like Chambouleyrón and Willington (1998), Balbo and Posadas (1998) 
and Cerro and Meloni (2000) using panel data. These papers estimate static panel data 
model, considering total and property crime.  
 
This paper tries to shed light on the effect of deterrence and socioeconomic factors on total 
crime, on property crime1, on crime against persons, and on its typologies in the period 2000-
2008 for Argentine Provinces. Furthermore, we apply the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) to account for unobserved heterogeneity, measurement error in the crime rates and 
potential endogeneity of the deterrence variables.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows: After the introduction, Section II presents the 
theoretical and empirical evidence; Section III shows an overview of data and crime 
characteristics in Argentina. Section IV outlines the empirical model and discusses the 
econometric results. Section V concludes 
 
 
II. Theoretical and empirical evidence 
 
The hypothesis that unemployment, income distribution, and other variables characterizing 
the economic environment of the region affects crime can be traced out to Adam Smith. But it 
was not until the seminal paper of Gary Becker in 1968 that the first models of economics of 
crime upsurge.  
 
Becker (1968) established that crime is an economically important activity and the decision to 
participate in it, is an economic choice taken by rational agents. This decision comes form a 
maximization problem in which agents compare costs and benefits of legal and illegal 
activities taking into accounts the probability of being arrested and punished. 
                                               
1
 A previous study is carried out by Cerro and Rodriguez (2011) 
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Theoretical literature of crime emphasize on two fundamental aspects: the deterrence effect, 
related to the probability of being arrested and of being condemned and the social and 
macroeconomic effect of environment which generates an atmosphere prone to crime, 
measured by variables such as the unemployment rate, income per capita, income growth, 
inequality in income distribution, education, among others. 
 
As discussed in Cantor and  Land (1985) there is a controversy regarding the relationship 
between economic growth and crime. There are two different types of effect: motivation effect 
and opportunity effect. The first one refers to the incentive to commit crime based on bad 
economic conditions. Hence, during recessions, individuals increase crime participation in 
order to increase their income. The second one works in the opposite way: the opportunities 
to commit crime increase along with the economic performance2. (See Dettoto and Otranto 
2011).  
 
It is worth noting that the impact of opportunity and motivational effect can be different 
depending on the crime typology under study. For instance, property crimes can be more 
affected by motivation effects that imply a negative correlation with the economic fluctuations. 
 
So the expected sign of GDP per capita and its growth is ambiguous. In this context, it could 
be more appropriate the use of relative deprivation indicators (GINI coefficient). The effect of 
inequality on crime is expected to be negative, since as Adam Smith noted “The affluence of 
the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted 
by envy, to invade his possessions”3 
 
There are numerous studies on the relationship between crime and inequality. Many of these 
studies find that relative income impacts on crime (see Fajnzylber et al., 2002, Brush, 2007; 
Choe, 2008, Cerro and Meloni, 2001). However other works fail to find a robust effect of 
inequality on crime (for instance, Neumayer, 2004).  
 
Unemployment rates measure the absence of legal income opportunities and are central part 
of criminiometric of the Becker-Ehrlich type models (Entorf and Spengler, 2000). 
Unemployment, as it limits the rate of return of legal activities, is expected to increase illegal 
activities. However, studies on the relationship between crime and unemployment conclude 
that the effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous and appears to be very sensitive to 
econometric specification. Freeman (1994) and Imrohoroglu et al (2001) research support 
this finding. Freeman (1994) and Maciandaro (1999) set that the effect of job market on crime 
may be studied through time series, cross section and economic characteristic across 
people. Depending on the type of study performed it is likely to obtain different results (for 
instance, Witt et al (1998), Marselli and Vannini (2000). For Argentina, Cerro and Rodriguez 
Andrés (2010) in a time series study using ARDL approach find support for a long run 
relationship between unemployment and crime. 
 
Rodríguez Andrés (2003) in a static panel study for Spain find that, once controlling for the 
endogeneity of the probability of arrest, GDP pc, and education have a positive effect on 
criminal activities, while unemployment is not significant.  
The expected signs of deterrence variables are negative since they represent a cost to those 
who commit crimes. Therefore, as the rate of sentence and conviction increases, the crime 
rate is expected to decrease, ceteris paribus. This effect is well documented for the US and 
Europe (Levitt, 1998; Edmark, 2005; Entorf and Spengler, 2000). For Argentina, Di Tella and 
                                               
2
 Although the potential victims could neutralize this "richness" effect by destining more resources against crime 
(alarms, bars, etc.) 
3
 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book V,Chapter 1, Part II, page 670, Orbis Editions, 1983. 
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Schargrodsky (2004) find a large deterrent effect of police on crime, by measuring the car 
thefts before and after an Argentinean exogenous event. 
Cook (2008) analyzing urban crime find that the declination in crime observed during the 90´s 
in USA, is not related to socio-economic conditions but with the police enforcement. On the 
other hand, Dills et al. (2008) studying the crime rate for the last 40 years, find no concluding 
relation among crime rates and deterrence and socio economic variables.  
 
Empirical applications for Argentina carried out by Chambouleyron and Navarro (1997) and 
by Kessler and Molinari (1997), who work with crime rate as dependent variable, find a 
significant deterrence and socio- economic effect. On the other hand, Chambouleyron and 
Willington (1998) using property crime, also find an important deterrence effect but not a 
socio-economic one. Balbo and Posadas (1998) also analyze the argentine case, using as 
the dependant variable the number of crimes, and they find a negative effect in the probability 
of arrest, not finding an important effect in the different severity of sanctions on the crime 
rate. On the other hand, Cerro and Meloni (1999) in a panel study find a significant socio 
economic effect on criminal activities. They also found an important deterrence effect 
measured by the probability of arrest and sentence. Perlabach et al. (2007) in a cross study 
for Mendoza’s councils find that both deterrence and socio economic effects are relevant in 
crime rate explanation. 
 
 
III. Overview Crime in Argentina  
 
Argentina is a country characterized by huge volatility in its economic activity and in its 
judicial system. Analyzing the rate of crime in Argentina, we can identify different periods, that 
lead us think that deterrence and macroeconomic effect are both very important to explain 
crime.  
 
At the beginning of the 80’s, Argentina crime rate was very low. The deterrence effect might 
have been strong, given that the country was under a Military Government regime, and the 
Constitutional Rights were not in force.  
 
In 1983, with the upcoming of democracy, important modifications took place in the Criminal 
Code (especially to laws 11179, 23050 and 23057 and in 1984 the law 23077 was enacted) 
and in the Criminal Code Procedures (law 2372) that implied considerable reductions in the 
punishment to criminal activities. Consequently with these modifications we see sustained 
increases in the crime rate. 
 
Despite the huge economic recovery after 2001 crisis, the crime rate keeps high, and even 
increasing in the last years4. We conjecture that a decreasing deterrence effect might have 
been responsible, partially, for that. Even thought since 1984 there were no considerable 
modifications in the Criminal Code, a new jurisprudential wave upsurge, which aims to limit 
the punitive power of the state, known as Garantismo. 
 
According to official statistics, the reported crime rate in Argentina increased 312.6 % in the 
period that span from 1980 to 2008, i.e., it increased at an average annual rate of 5.2%. 
However the growth rate was not smooth during the whole period. During the two deep crises 
Argentina went thought in this period, the 1989-1990 and 2001-2002; the crime rate grew 
faster, and reached peaks of 202 crimes per 10000 inhabitants in 1989 and of 358 in 2002.  
 
 
 
                                               
4
 Official data is not available since 2008, but according to Victimization Survey of Universidad Di Tella victims of crime has 
increased. 
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Graph 1.  Crime and Sentence Rate. Argentina 1980-2007 
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After that it experienced a slight fall until 2007 when it increased again reaching 329 crimes 
per 10000 inhabitants in 2008. Statistics on crime are no longer available, but we conjecture 
that it has been increasing in the last years. Even more, the victimization survey of 
Universidad Di Tella, reports a victimization rate for 2008 of 28.4%, in 2009 of 34.1% and up 
to august 2010, 33.3%.  
 
Similarly, property crime rate increased 5.14% yearly in the period 1991-2008, reaching in 
2008 a rate of 193 property crimes per 10.000 inhabitants. Property crimes represent nearly 
60% of total crimes and it is the larger group of crimes5. Among property crimes, robbery has 
the higher participation; it represents 52% of total property crimes, followed by thefts, with 
37%, and then other types of crimes such as extortions, kidnappings, frauds and usurpation 
among others. (Table 1), Notice that the probability of sentence is far higher in robberies than 
in other property crimes, given the severity of the offense. 
 
 
Table 1. Property Crimes: Theft, Robbery and Others. Argentina 2000-2008 
 Reported 
Crimes 
Participation 
in Property 
Crime % 
Crime Rate 
per 10000 
inhabitants 
Probability of 
Arrest % 
Probability of 
Sentence % 
Theft 284205 37 71.5 14.49 6.49 
Robbery 398361 52 100.2 15.53 24.25 
Others 86661 11 21.8 37.51 7.19 
Property 769227 100 193.5 17.62 14.77 
Source: Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal 
 
On the other hand, the behavior of thefts and robberies have been similar on until 2007, 
when robberies, ie crimes with violence, have increased participation in property crimes 
(Graph2). Notice that both thefts and robberies behaved similarly in the 2001-2002 crisis, 
while other types of  property crimes do not seem to depend on bad economic conditions 
probably because they are mostly “white collar” type of crimes, such as extortions, 
kidnappings, frauds, usury, and usurpation among others, where offenders need different 
skills. 
 
 
                                               
5
 Followed by Crimes Against Person, with a share of 22%, Crimes against Freedom with 11%, Crimes against Public 
Administration, with 2%, Crimes against personal dignity with 0,08%, and other types of crimes with 2.3% 
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Graph 2.  Thef, Robbery and Other Property Crimes Rate. Argentina 2000-2008 
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On the other hand the probability of arrest of different typologies of property crimes has 
shown a slight increase until 2003, then it falls up to 2007. In 2008 there is an increase in the 
probability of arrest of robberies.  
 
 
Graph 3.  Probability of Arrest: Thef, Robbery and Other Property Crimes. 
 Argentina 2000-2008 
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Th
ef
t&
Ro
bb
er
y
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.5
O
th
er
s
Theft Robbery Others
 
 
 
The probability of sentence is significantly different in robberies than in theft and other 
property crimes. This probability has increased up to 2002 to show a fall afterwards, which 
may be partly explained by the increased participation of young offenders (under 16 years 
old) that are not imputable according to penal law.  
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Graph 4. Probability of Sentence: Theft, Robbery and Other Property Crimes.   
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The third group in importance for its participation in total crime is crimes against person, with 
a share of 22%. Among these crimes we find murder, involuntary manslaughter, injuries and 
traffic fatalities. 
Even thought murders represent only 0.8% of crimes against person; these crimes are the 
most sounded ones for their severity.   
 
 
Graph 5 Crimes Against Person and Murder Rates.  Argentina 2000-2008 
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Notice that crimes against person are always increasing, independently on the phase of the 
economic cycle, while, surprisingly, murder follows the same patterns than property crimes, it 
increases in 2002, in coincidence with the economic recession and then it falls afterwards 
with the economic expansion, to increase again in 2008 (Graph 5). The probability of arrest in 
murder is higher than in any other type of crime, it increases from a value of 61% in 2001 up 
to 88% in 2008. The probability of sentence is also high related to other types of crimes, but 
its behavior on time is similar to other types of crime, it increases up to 2004, to decrease 
afterwards. 
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III.1 Crime Rate in Provinces 
 
In Table 2 we show criminal statistics per provinces in 2008. The reported criminal activity 
exhibits high dispersion among them. The City of Buenos Aires is at the top of crimes per 
inhabitants with 728.2 crimes per 10000 inhabitants6, followed by the province of Neuquén 
with a rate of 613. On the other hand, at the bottom of the table, we find the province of 
Buenos Aires, with 201 crimes per 10000. 
 
Table 2. Property Crime Rates, Probability of Arrest and Sentence.  
Argentina Provinces 2008 
 Property Crime 
Rate per 10000 
inhabitants 
Probability of 
Arrest per 100 
Property Crimes 
Sentence Rate 
per 100 Arrest 
Ciudad de Bs As 515 5.45 49.41 
Neuquen 429 14.11 12.44 
Mendoza 382 na na 
Santa Cruz 305 22.31 3.58 
Rio Negro 280 7.35 25.55 
Salta  269 na na 
San Juan 265 21.95 4.64 
Cordoba  260 19.90 6.06 
Jujuy 245 19.33 0.65 
Catamarca 233 19.62 3.16 
Tierra del Fuego 231 32.69 3.89 
País 193 20.19 14.09 
Santa Fe 206 19.85 14.93 
La Pampa 205 37.38 7.52 
Chubut 193 22.37 5.33 
Chaco  180 49.56 2.02 
Corrientes 159 18.35 3.96 
San Luis 154 20.39 4.07 
Misiones 134 13.66 9.04 
Entre Rios  121 26.80 4.60 
Formosa  115 41.29 5.52 
La Rioja 106 37.14 4.01 
Santiago del Estero 105 36.72 0.48 
Tucumán 98 31.76 4.07 
Bs As 98 30.20 21.13 
Source: Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal 
 
 
 
                                               
6
 We conjecture that in the City of Buenos Aires the crime rate is overestimated, since population used to 
calculate this rate is smaller, given that many persons from the province of Buenos Aires, from the rest of the 
country and from abroad work and visit this City. 
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The annual average growth rate also show great disparity, going from 8.0% per year in 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires in the period 1980-2008 to 0.77% in Santiago del Estero. 
Property Crime Rate shows similar behavior than Total Crime (Graph 6). The highest rate 
corresponds to the City of Buenos Aires with a value of 515.8 property crimes per 10.000 
inhabitants, while Province of Buenos Aires exhibits the lowest rate with only 95.8 property 
crimes per 10.000 inhabitants. 
 
 
Graph 6. Total and Property Crime Rates. Argentine Provinces 2008 
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Probability of Arrest and Sentence also vary greatly among provinces. The highest probability 
of arrest corresponds to the Province of Chaco, with a value of 49.56 arrests, while the City of 
Buenos Aires has the lower value (5.45%). The average of the country is 20.19% of arrest 
related to property crimes.  
 
On the other hand the probability of sentence varies greatly among Argentinean provinces. 
The highest rate corresponds to the City of Buenos Aires with 49.41%, while the lowest one 
to the province of Santiago del Estero, with only 0.48%, the average of the country is 14.09%. 
This sentence rate is related to the provincial justice performance. 
 
We can also see huge dispersion in Murder (Graph 7) among provinces. At the top of Murder 
Rate is the province of Chubut with 0.84 murders per 10000 inhabitants, while at the bottom 
we have the province of Catamarca with a rate of only 0.08, but on the other hand it is the 
province with higher crimes against person. 
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Graph 7. Crimes Against Person and Murder Rates, Argentina Provinces  
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Socio-economic conditions vary greatly among provinces (Table 3). GDP pc takes values as 
high as 31014 constant 1993 pesos per capita in the City of Buenos Aires as small as 2996 in 
the province of Santiago del Estero, i.e ten times smaller. The unemployment rate also shows 
great disparities among provinces. The province of San Luis has an unemployment rate of 
just 1.3, while Entre Ríos and Santa Fe reach values of 10.6%. On the other hand Gini 
coefficient, a measure of income distribution within each province, also shows important 
differences among provinces. The higher dispersion corresponds to Chaco, while the lower 
one to the province of Formosa. 
 
 
Table 3. GDP per capita, Unemployment Rate and Gini Coefficient.  Argentina Provinces 2008 
 
PROVINCE  GDP pc 
(constant 1993 
pesos) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Buenos Aires 7309 9.4 41.1 
Catamarca 4304 8.6 41.7 
Chaco 3779 3.9 44.5 
Chubut 9172 6.7 37.6 
City of Buenos Aires 31014 5.7 44.2 
Córdoba 7727 7.3 41.5 
Corrientes 4305 6.9 44.3 
Entre Ríos 5706 10.6 38.9 
Formosa 3752 2.7 35.4 
Jujuy 3915 7 41.1 
La Pampa 8739 4.6 41.5 
La Rioja 5012 7.1 38.5 
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Mendoza 8123 4 40 
Misiones 4353 5 42.5 
Neuquén 11601 7.1 40.9 
Río Negro 8318 9.9 42.7 
Salta 4245 9.2 41.6 
San Juan 5782 7 39.7 
San Luis 7860 1.3 38.3 
Santa Cruz 14120 2 39 
Santa Fe 8075 10.6 42.8 
Santiago del Estero 2996 5 39.3 
Tierra del Fuego 18494 5.6 37.8 
Tucumán 4848 9.2 43.9 
Source: Ministry of Economics, INDEC and IELDE 
 
 
 
 
IV. Model 
 
The model to be used for the empirical analysis of the argentine case intends to capture the 
deterrence and socio-economic effects. The variable to be explained will be total crime rate 
and property crime rate, globally and for different property crimes and crimes against person 
typologies, defined as the number of reported crimes per 10.000 inhabitants. 
 
In order to capture the deterrence effect, we include variables that measure the cost of 
developing criminal activities: the probability of arrest related to crime and the probability of 
sentence once arrested. The expected sign of these variables is negative since they 
represent a cost to those who commit a crime. As these probabilities depend on different 
agents (the probability of arrest depends on police performance, whereas the probability of 
sentence depends on juridical performance) we have to consider them separately, when data 
availability allow us. (see Table I in Appendix) 
 
There are different variables that point to the social-economic factors: unemployment, 
measures of income distribution (Gini coefficient) and GDP per capita may be important to 
explain criminal activities, GDP growth and economic growth cycle. 
 
These variables indicate two different types of effect: motivation effect and opportunity effect. 
The first one refers to the incentive to commit crime based on bad economic conditions. 
Hence, during recessions, individuals increase crime participation in order to increase their 
income. The second one works in the opposite way: the opportunities to commit crime 
increase along with the economic performance. (see Dettoto and Otranto 2011).  
 
It is worth noting that the impact of opportunity and motivational effect can be different 
depending on the crime typology under study. For instance, property crimes can be more 
affected by motivation effects that imply a negative correlation with the economic fluctuations. 
 
We can also include other variables that measure socio economic conditions such as level of 
education and mortality rates. These variables differ significantly among provinces, but they 
do no vary much over time, so they can be captured by the fixed effect. 
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IV.1  Econometric framework 
 
In order to investigate the impact of socioeconomic factors on crime, we estimate the 
following dynamic panel data model: 
 
 CRit  = αi + λt +η CRit-1+ ßXit + εit      (1) 
 
here i states for province and t for year, CR is the log of the number of crimes (total or 
property) per 10,000 inhabitants, αi is a province effect, λt  is a year fixed effect, Xit is a vector 
of economic and deterrence effect variables,  and εit  is the error term. The fixed effects 
remove variation in crime rates caused by factors varying across provinces but constant over 
time.  
 
From an econometric perspective, there might be several methodological problems which 
might arise in estimating these empirical models. First using a panel data approach, it is well 
known that OLS coefficients are biased as they ignore the presence of unobservable 
individual effects. Second, we also include lagged values of crime rate, in this context, OLS 
results in inconsistent estimates. Third, it is very unlikely that our regressors are strictly 
exogenous: the relationship between crime and its socioeconomic factors is often 
characterized by two way causality. Fourth, crime rates are measured with error which might 
lead to biased estimates.  
 
 Here we opt for the ‘system’ Generalized Method of Moments estimator (henceforth, ‘system 
GMM’) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) . This estimator is designed for dynamic panel 
data models. The Arellano and Bond estimator can perform poorly if the autoregressive 
parameters are too large or the ratio of the variance of the panel-level effect to the variance 
of idiosyncratic error is too large. Building on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell 
and Bond (1998) developed a system estimator that uses additional moment conditions. (see 
Bond 2002). This estimator is designed for datasets with many panels and few periods. This 
method assumes that there is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors and requires the 
initial condition that the panel-level effects be uncorrelated with the first difference of the first 
observation of the dependent variable. 
 
In all our specifications, we report the p-values of the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation 
applied to the first difference equation residuals (in which we expect not to reject the null 
hypothesis on an autoregressive regression model AR(1) but we are hoping to reject the null 
hypothesis of second order autocorrelation so as to conclude that lagged values of the 
endogenous variables are valid instruments). Finally, we report the p-values of the standard 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (the null hypothesis is that the instruments used by 
the system GMM estimator – as a group –are exogenous). These specification tests will 
confirm whether the system GMM estimator is indeed appropriate in our case.  
 
 
IV.2 Data  
 
Data used in this paper were collected from several national sources. Data on crime, arrest 
and on sentences were extracted from Registro Nacional de Reincidencia Criminal. Crime 
rates were defined as the number of reported offences per 10,000 inhabitants. Arrest rates 
were defined as the number of crimes with known subjects related to crimes. Sentence rates, 
were defined for total crime and for crimes against person as the number of sentences per 
100 crimes, while for murder and property crime with its different typologies as the number of 
sentences per arrest (see Table I in Appendix). The Gini coefficient was obtained for the 
period 1990-1999 from Gasparini et al (2000) and since 2000 to 2007 from Instituto de 
Estudios Laborales y Desarrollo Económico (IELDE). Data is not available before 1990. 
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GDP per capita in constant pesos were obtained from Office of the Ministry of Economics and 
Public, from Mirabella and Nanni (1998), and from 2000 to 2008 estimates based on income-
output matrix. 
 
Data for unemployment rates (%) were extracted from the Permanent Home Survey by 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC). The dataset used in this paper is a panel 
of annual, province level observations running from 1980-2007. Table displays summary 
statistics for the variables employed in the empirical analysis.  
 
  
IV.3 Empirical Results 
Total Crimes 
 
The results of the two step estimator Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond model are presented in 
Table 4, first column. The dependent variable – Crime Rate- lagged once is very significant, 
far more than the other explicatory variables. It measures the inertia effect in time and it 
indicates that an increase in the crime rate in t-1 of 10%, increases the crime rate in 7.2% the 
next period. 
 
GDP per capita, unemployment rate and Gini coefficient have positive and significant effect 
on crime rate, showing that those provinces with higher GDP pc, unemployment and higher 
dispersion in the income distribution have higher reported crime rate7, while economic growth 
cycle, indicates that in recessions crime rate increases, showing that the motivation effect 
dominates the opportunity one.  On the other hand sentence rate has a negative and 
significant effect on crime rate: an increase of 10% in the sentence rate decreases the crime 
rate in 1%. All the variables jointly are significant, with a probability of rejecting the null of 0% 
(Wald test). 
 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions show that the instruments and the model are 
correct, not rejecting the null (Table 4). We also test for the presence of first and second 
order autocorrelation in the first differenced errors by Arellano-Bond test. When the 
idiosyncratic errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the first differenced 
errors are first-order serially correlated. However serial correlation in the first-differenced 
errors at an order higher than 1 implies that the moment conditions used are not valid since it 
would yield inconsistent GMM estimators. The output presents no significant evidence of 
serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order 2. 
                                               
7
 We interpret coefficients in this way, since the variance between is far grater than the variance within for these 
variables. 
 14 
Table 4. GMM Estimation Results. Total and Property Crimes 
Total (1) Property (2) Property (3) Theft (4) Robbery (5) Other (6) 
1980-2008 1990-2008 2000-2008 
 
Coeffici
ent P>|z| 
Coeffici
ent P>|z|    
Coeffici
ent P>|z| 
Coeffici
ent P>|z| 
Coeffici
ent P>|z| 
Coeffici
ent P>|z| 
Crime Ratet-1 0.734 0.00 0.686 0.00 0.650 0.00 0.130 0.00 0.229 0.00 0.036 0.00 
GDP pc 0.107 0.00 0.049 0.57         
GDP Growth 
    -0.002 0.02 0.004 0.00 -0.002 0.00 0.005 0.00 
Unemployment Rate 0.076 0.00 0.120 0.00 0158 0.00 0.127 0.00 0.059 0.02 -0.049 0.42 
Gini 0.594 0.00 0.182 0.36 0.213 0.33 1.117 0.00 0.487 0.00 0.338 0.59 
Arrest Rate 
  -0.162 0.00 -0.176 0.00 -0.714 0.00 -0.759 0.00 -1.020 0.00 
Sentence Rate 
-0.102 0.00 -0.054 0.03 -0.051 0.000 -0.192 0.000 -0.119 0.00 0.000 0.99 
Cycle 
-0.023 0.00 0.057 0.00         
Constant 
-0.800 0.019 -0.137 -0.09 0.262 0.738 -0.536 0.642 1.649 0.00 3.428 0.13 
Wald chi2 (5) 
 4521 0.000 4692 0.000 1474 0.000 2267 0.000 2948 0.00 7184 0.00 
p-value Sargan test of over 
-identifying restrictions 20.95 1.000  19.83 1.000 18.54 1.000 18.38 0.986 18.61 0.98 16.85 0.99 
p-value Arellano and Bond test 
 for AR(1) in first differences -1.84 0.063 -1.479 0.139 -1.518 0.128 -2.147 0.031 -2.089 0.036 -1.943 0.051 
p-value Arellano and Bond test 
 for AR(2) in first differences 0.679 0.497 0.434 0.663 0.456 0.647 -0.362 0.717 -1.461 0.143 -0.319 0.749 
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Table 5.  GMM Estimation Results. Crimes Against Person and Murder 
 
Crimes Against Person (1) Murders (2) 
 
2000-2008 
 Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z|    
Crime Ratet-1 0.272 0.00 0.207 0.00 0.267 0.00 
GDP pc 0.339 0.00 
  -0.486 0.00 
GDP Growth 0.0008 0.054 
    
Unemployment Rate -0.009 0.752 0.067 0.378 0.002 0.95 
Gini 0.179 0.260 
1.004 0.049 0.033 0.95 
Arrest Rate   
-0.497 0.00 -0.452 0.00 
Sentence Rate -0.077 0.00 
-0.308 0.00 -0.359 0.03 
Cycle -0.013 0.419 
-0.037 0.194 -0.0509 0.082 
Constant -0.731 0.20 
-3.305 0.097 5.103 0.079 
Wald chi2 (5) 2268 0.00 3536 0.00 4979 0.000 
p-value Sargan test of over 
-identifying restrictions 
18.39 0.98 
12.93 0.98 10.34 0.98 
p-value Arellano and Bond test 
 for AR(1) in first differences 
-1.65 0.09 
-2.704 0.0069 -2.53 0.011 
-value Arellano and Bond test 
 for AR(2) in first differences 
0.594 0.55 1.169 0.2421 0.877 0.38 
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Property Crimes 
 
The results obtained for Property Crime Rate as dependent variable is shown in 
Column 2, Table 4. The main difference with the results obtained for the total crime rate 
is that the coefficient of Unemployment Rate becomes larger (it comes from 0.076 to 
0.157), while GDP pc and Gini coefficient are not significant. For property crime rates, 
unemployment is twice as important as for total crime rates explanation, while the 
difference in economic activity and/or differences in income distribution are less 
important. On the other hand GDP growth is negative and significant, meaning that 
motivation effect dominates opportunity effect as expected. The inertia effect is also 
very significant. 
The results of Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are similar to those obtained for the 
former model, so the same comment applies: the instruments are correct and 
autocorrelation AR(1) is not a problem for GMM estimations. 
 
Property, Theft, Robberies and Other Property Crimes 
 
The results for these typologies of crimes as dependent variables are presented in 
Table 4 Columns 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
 
First, for property crimes, results are very robust to the period considered; magnitude, 
sign and significance of the parameters estimated are almost identical when 
considered both periods, 1990-2008 and 2000-2008. 
 
Second, the inertia effect measured by the lagged dependent variables is far smaller 
than in aggregate property crime, with a value of 0.13, 0.229 and 0.036 for theft, 
robberies and other crimes respectively, probably since more disaggregate type of 
crimes are better explained by socio economic and deterrence variables.  
 
Third, GDP growth coefficient is positive and significant in the case of theft and other 
crimes, indicating that the opportunity effect dominates over motivation effect. For 
robberies, that coefficient becomes negative and significant, as in property crimes. 
 
Fourth, unemployment rate is significant and positive both for theft and robberies. 
Notice that the effect of unemployment on crime is twice as much as in theft, with a 
value of 0.127, than in robberies ( 0,059). 
 
Gini coefficient, which is a measure of income distribution, is positive for the three 
types of property crimes considered, and significant for thefts and robberies, indicating 
that the worst income distribution, the higher property crimes will be. The effect is 
greater for theft than for robberies: a deterioration of 10% in income distribution will 
increase thefts in 11%, while robberies 4.87%. This fact jointly with the coefficient of 
unemployment seems to indicate that socio economic conditions are more important 
for theft than for robberies, possibly because those who commit thefts are eventual 
thieves, less specialized and consequently more dependent on economic conditions. 
 
Deterrence effect, measured by arrest and sentence rate, is significant and negative for 
both theft and robbery, being the effect of arrest stronger than the effect of sentence. 
These results point to the relevance of both police and judicial performance in the 
deterrence of crime. 
 
For theft, robberies and other property crimes estimations, the results of Sargan and 
Arellano-Bond tests indicates that the instruments are correct and autocorrelation 
AR(1) is not a problem for GMM estimations. 
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Crimes Against Person 
 
The results of the two step estimator Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond model are 
presented in Table 5, first column. The dependent variable lagged once is capturing the 
inertia effect, and it is positive and significant. 
 
GDP pc has a positive and significant effect, possibly since  crimes against person 
include traffic fatalities, whose participation has increased pari pasu with the huge 
increase in fleet. At the same time, the increase in fleet has been higher in regions with 
higher GDP pc. GDP growth is also positive and significant. A similar explanation 
holds, but GDP growth is measuring mainly the effect on time. Unemployment, Gini 
coefficient and cycle are not statistically significant. 
 
On the other hand sentence rate 8 has, as usual, a negative and significant effect on 
crime.  
 
 
Murder 
 
Murder has a very low participation in crime against persons, just 0.8%, but generally 
are much sounded crimes due to its severity. Results are presented in table 4, second 
and third column. 
 
We find that unemployment rate is not significant in the explanation of murder. The 
deterrence effect, measured by the probability of arrest and sentence, is always 
negative and significant. 
 
On the other hand, we find a negative and significant effect of GDP pc and cycle on 
murder, meaning that murder behaves contracyclically, ie, it increases in recessions 
and decreases in expansion, consistently with what we observed in Graph 4. 
Additionally it increases in regions with lower GDP pc, indicating that murder is related 
to economic condition. 
 
Both for crimes against persons and murder, the results of Sargan and Arellano-Bond 
tests indicates that the instruments are correct and autocorrelation AR(1) is not a 
problem for GMM estimations. 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the effect of socioeconomic variables on crime aggregate and for 
different typologies of crime in Argentina over the period 1980-2008 and subperiods. 
For that purpose we use regional data at province level and estimate a dynamic panel 
data model by using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998).  
 
We found that socio economic effect is very important in explaining crime. The impact 
and the significance of the different explanatory variables depend on the category of 
crime. 
 
                                               
8
 In this case, sentence rate is measured as the ratio between sentence and crimes against person, since we 
do not have data of arrest. 
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We analyzed total crime rate, property crime rate: composed by theft, robberies and 
other property crimes and crimes against person, including murder separately. We 
accounted for different categories of crime in order to avoid the aggregation bias 
(Cherry and List, 2002). 
 
The inertia effect, measured by the lagged dependent variable, is always positive and 
significant, but the magnitude depends on the categories of crime. It indicates that an 
increase in the rate of crime today will increase the crime rate in the next period. 
 
GDP per capita has a positive effect on total and property crime, but it is not significant 
in the last case. It indicates that those provinces with higher GDP per capita presents 
better opportunities for those committing crimes, increasing the crime rate, so the 
opportunity effect dominates over motivation effect across provinces. The effect of 
GDP pc is also positive on crimes against person, possibly because this crime includes 
traffic fatalities that have been increasing with the increase in fleet, especially in those 
provinces with higher GDP pc. The sign of this variable in the case of murder is 
negative; indicating that those regions with lower GDP pc have higher rate of murder. 
 
GDP growth captures the effect of economic growth on crime rates,effect. It is 
negatively associated to property crimes and robberies, but positively with theft, other 
property crimes and crimes against person. In the former motivation effect dominates 
over opportunity effect along time, as expected. The reverse is true for theft. In the 
case of crime against persons it may be capturing (similar to GDP pc) the positive 
association between GDP growth and traffic fatalities growth, mainly due to fleet 
growth. 
 
On the other hand, unemployment rate, that may be interpreted as the opportunity cost 
of being in legal rather than illegal activities, is always positive and significant (with the 
sole exception of other property crimes) in total and property crimes, indicating that the 
higher the unemployment rate is, ie the less the opportunity cost of being in illegal 
activities, the higher the crime rate will be, as expected.  The magnitude of the effect on 
crime depends on the typology of crime. It varies from 0.059 to 0.158, being higher for 
property crime rate and theft than for other type of crimes. Thefts depend more on 
motivation than on opportunities. In crimes against person and murder this coefficient is 
not significant. 
 
Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, is always positive, but not always 
significant, meaning that those provinces with worst income distribution have higher 
rates of crime, both for property crime and for crimes against person. 
 
Deterrence effect measured by the probability of arrest and sentence is always 
negative and significance, indicating that is a cost for those who commit crimes. The 
higher the arrest rate is, that depends on policy performance, and the sentence rate, 
that depends on judicial performance, the less is the crime rate. 
 
In conclusion: a) Socio Economic Variables are very important in explaining crimes, but 
their sign and magnitude depend on the typology of crime. Surprisingly murder also 
depends on socio economic conditions. b) Deterrence effect is always significant and 
negative, independently on the type of crime. 
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Appendix. 
 
Table I. Crime Data Availability 
 
 Recorded Crime 
Rate 
Arrest Rate Sentence Rate 
Total Crime 1980-2008 1980-2000 1980-2008 
Property Crime 1990-2008 1990-1997 
2000-2008 
1990-2008 
Theft 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008 
Robbery 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008 
Other Property Crime 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008 
Crime Against Person 2000-2008  2000-2008 
Murder 2000-2008 2000-2008 2000-2008 
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